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Abstract—MapReduce is a programming model used ex-
tensively for parallel data processing in distributed environ-
ments. A wide range of algorithms were implemented using
MapReduce, from simple tasks like sorting and searching up to
complex clustering and machine learning operations. Many of
these implementations are part of services externalized to cloud
infrastructures. Over the past years, however, many concerns
have been raised regarding the security guarantees offered in
such environments. Some solutions relying on cryptography
were proposed for countering threats but these typically imply
a high computational overhead. Intel, the largest manufacturer
of commodity CPUs, recently introduced SGX (software guard
extensions), a set of hardware instructions that support execu-
tion of code in an isolated secure environment. In this paper, we
explore the use of Intel SGX for providing privacy guarantees
for MapReduce operations, and based on our evaluation we
conclude that it represents a viable alternative to a crypto-
graphic mechanism. We present results based on the widely
used k-means clustering algorithm, but our implementation
can be generalized to other applications that can be expressed
using MapReduce model.
Keywords-distributed processing; security; MapReduce.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since it was officially adopted by Google [1] in 2008, the
MapReduce programming model consistently gained ground
as a viable solution for assuring the necessary scalability of
distributed data processing. The generic model, composed
of the two main map and reduce functions, was widely used
to implement applications that can leverage parallel task
processing. In this generic model, the data to be processed is
typically located over a series of mapper nodes, which apply
in parallel a map function responsible for mapping individual
data items to a finite set of predefined keys. The output is
redistributed in a shuffle step based on the key mappings to
reducer nodes, which execute in parallel a reduce function
for processing each set of data items corresponding to a
certain key. This model can be used in processing tasks
that range from simple operations that can be composed
like counting, sorting, and searching data to more complex
algorithms like cross-correlation or page rank. MapReduce
was adapted in different ways to fit this wide diversity of
scenarios, as well as different deployment environments.
Particular settings where the deployment of MapReduce
encountered difficulties are services that require security
guarantees. For cost savings purposes, data analysis and
processing services are more and more often deployed
to public cloud infrastructures, which do not offer strong
security guarantees and hence make sensitive data prone
to privacy and integrity risks. If such services rely on a
MapReduce-based implementation, it is of high importance
to find a way to adapt the programming model in a manner
that provides the required security assurance to the system.
As we refer in Section II, some solutions use complex
cryptographic techniques for protecting the privacy of the
data being processed in the map and reduce functions.
Such techniques are typically complex: they range from
secret sharing to homomorphic encryption, depending on
the exact operations that need to be executed over the
sensitive data in each use case. In particular the choice of the
encryption is largely determined by the task to be executed
in the reducers. Therefore, a common limitation is that the
customized data encryption schemes used often have limited
expressiveness and are applicable to only a small class of
applications. Another drawback generally encountered is the
high performance overhead of complex encryption schemes,
homomorphic encryption in particular being notorious for its
lack of practicality. Finally such solutions address mostly the
privacy of the data, but much less often the privacy or the
integrity of the code itself, which is a key concern when
externalizing a service to a public cloud.
A different approach to security is to rely on trusted
execution environments (TEE) supported in hardware. A
TEE provides an isolated space for executing code where
confidentiality and integrity are assured. Software guard
extensions (SGX) is a powerful TEE included in the Intel’s
commodity processors starting with the Skylake generation
in late 2015. The SGX-capable processors provide the possi-
bility of running code in enclaves that are isolated from the
other memory used by system processes. This facilitates the
provision of privacy and integrity for proprietary algorithm
implementations and for sensitive data. The code designated
to run in the enclave space is not accessible from outside.
Sensitive data can be protected using state-of-the-art encryp-
tion algorithms while outside the enclave and decrypted only
inside where is processed efficiently in plaintext form—but
shielded from the rest of the system.
In our work we propose a self-contained framework for
securing MapReduce that leverages the benefits of SGX’s
trusted execution environment. Our system architecture com-
bines a lightweight virtual machine based on the Lua
language, a MapReduce library, and a publish/subscribe
service for communication between the client and worker
nodes. Unlike cryptographic solutions, our approach is in-
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dependent of the particular characteristics of the map and
reduce functions and can hence be used for any problem
parallelizable with MapReduce. The specific code to be
executed in the MapReduce service can be integrated in
simple scripts, which are run privately and in isolation using
SGX over data decrypted only inside the enclave. Our focus
is on providing a flexible framework for securely running
MapReduce applications that can be easily implemented and
deployed. The basic word count MapReduce example, for
counting the number of occurrences of different word in a
given text, can be implemented in our framework with less
than 30 lines of code (LOC). We present in this paper an
evaluation of our approach using the widely used k-means
clustering algorithm, showing that the overhead incurred is
minimal and that our solution is applicable to other use
cases.
Our paper is structured as follows. We overview related
work in Section II, including other approaches on securing
MapReduce based services. We then present additional de-
tails on SGX and k-means in Section III, and we describe
the architecture of our solution in Section IV. Section V
covers the evaluation of the k-means use case by compar-
ing our SGX-secured architecture with a basic unsecured
implementation. We finally conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
VC3 [2] is an early proposal of a secure framework
for MapReduce services using an SGX emulator instead of
real SGX-enabled processors. The general idea behind the
framework design is relatively close to our proposal, the
user having the possibility to write its own map and reduce
functions that can execute in SGX-enabled machines. The
user code has to be written in C++, which can make the
implementations prone to potential faults like illegal memory
accesses. In this respect the authors provide an optional
compiler through which the programmers can enforce self-
integrity invariants for memory regions. The main advantage
in our proposed framework, which we more accurately
evaluate effectively on SGX-enabled processors, is the addi-
tional flexibility and ease-of-use of the high-level Lua-based
programming environment. The MapReduce implementation
in our case is enclosed in scripts, which are executed by a
standard Lua interpreter that is less prone to faults, easier to
maintain, and safer thanks to its small code base. The VC3
solution is further extended in [3], which focuses on security
issues generated by traffic analysis attacks on the exchanges
between mapper and reducer nodes. We do not consider such
attacks in our current work, but we believe that the analysis
and the solutions proposed are also applicable to our system.
M2R [4] is another proposal of a secure framework for
MapReduce, which takes a more general approach with
a generic design that can be implemented on any trusted
execution environment. The authors refer to SGX-enabled
processors as one potential target, but the evaluation is
conducted as in case of VC3 above on a TEE simulation
using a trusted Xen-4.4.3 kernel-based hypervisor. As in
[3], M2R specifically focuses on attacks exploiting the
leakage between mappers and reducers. M2R’s generic
design formalizes the execution of the MapReduce archi-
tecture in four trusted code base (TCB) components: mapT,
reduceT, mixT, and groupT, with the security of the latter
two being particularly critical as they are meant to contain
the mappers-to-reducers shuffle implementation. Evaluation
using the HiBench MapReduce benchmark suite [5] yields
the interesting observation that k-means clustering (which
we also consider in our tests) and grep, two computationally
intensive cases, do not leak extra information in the baseline
implementation without the shuffle phase’s extra security.
Therefore, in such situations, adding additional protection
between mappers and reducers will produce unnecessary
overheads.
In [6] the authors propose a solution that leverages Shamir
secret sharing [7] for executing queries over an outsourced
database using the MapReduce model. Each field in a
database record is split in secret shares that are constructed
for each letter in the field value. Each letter in the alphabet is
associated with a unary vector of 26 bits, with one index bit
set and the rest being zeroes. The secret shares are obtained
for each bit by applying 26 polynomials of identical degree.
Shares of numerical values, as well as the privacy preserving
queries submitted by users, are represented in the same
fashion. Mappers and reducers execute specific operations
depending on the queries on these shares for obtaining
the result. The individual computations seem rather simple
and efficient, since many of the initial bits are zeroes, but
the total number of values obtained in the encoding (26
per letter) still inflicts a high overhead. Furthermore, the
technique is limited to four query types: count, search,
equijoin, and range.
SecureMR [8] focuses on MapReduce integrity. In this
purpose some of the MapReduce tasks are replicated and
assigned to different mappers and reducers. The MapReduce
architecture is enhanced with several secure components:
a secure manager and a secure scheduler for task duplica-
tion and assignment, a secure task executor for DoS and
replay attacks prevention, a secure committer for consistency
checking of mappers intermediate results, and a secure
verifier that detects attacks based on results inconsistencies.
The solution takes in account neither the privacy of data nor
of the code.
Airavat [9] proposes to secure MapReduce using differ-
ential privacy, which is also combined with access control
policies provided by SELinux in the proposed implementa-
tion. The mappers can be both trusted and untrusted in the
proposed architecture, the approach relying on adding noise
in this phase in order to minimize leaks of sensitive data
in the map function output. Among the limitations of the
approach, one can mention that reducers should be always
trusted and that there is no possibility to chain multiple
MapReduce cycles on the same input data. Moreover, the
accuracy of the results depends on parameters that should
be carefully tweaked for obtaining a sound output.
Tagged MapReduce [10] considers the execution of
MapReduce computations over a hybrid cloud, where a part
of the infrastructure is public and untrusted and a part is
private and trusted. The sensitive data can be processed
securely only in the private part and is identified through tags
added to the tuples. For this purpose, the system architecture
involves a scheduler that assigns tasks to workers and control
the flow based on tags. The programmer can implement in
map and reduce functions specific policies that dictate how
data sensitivity changes during the processing. The solution
does not address a case where only a public untrusted cloud
is sufficient for deployment.
III. PRELIMINARIES
The MapReduce model includes three main sequential
phases in processing the input data, which we also briefly
described in Section I. In the first phase the mapper nodes in-
dependently execute a map function in which each individual
item in the distributed input data is mapped to a key. In the
second phase the (key, value) tuples obtained after mapping
are shuffled according to their keys and redistributed to
reducer nodes, such that all tuples corresponding to the
same key arrive on the same node. Optionally, in this phase
multiple tuples with the same key can be aggregated by a
combiner function in order to optimize the redistribution.
Finally, in the third phase reducer nodes process indepen-
dently in a local reduce function all data associated to a
key and output the result of their computation. In our work,
we are concerned with assuring the privacy and integrity of
the data processed within the map and reduce functions and
also of the code of these functions, while also offering to
the programmer an accessible lightweight environment of
implementing various use-cases. In the current solution we
do not consider any attacks targeting the in-between shuffle
phase like traffic analysis, leaving this for future work. In
the framework we propose data is encrypted outside of the
two main map and reduce functions, which are executed
securely in SGX enclaves.
In our architecture we use the publish/subscribe (pub/sub)
communication model [11], one of the most effective ways
of disseminating information in distributed systems. In the
generic model, publisher nodes submit data to a pub/sub
routing service as publications formed of a header describing
the data and a payload containing the effective data. The
pub/sub routing service matches the publications header
with subscriptions registered by subscriber nodes and further
routes the matching publications towards their destinations.
Our solution is based on a previous Secure Content-Based
Routing (SCBR) implementation [12] that evaluated the pub-
/sub communication model in an SGX secured environment.
In brief, in SCBR the matching and routing of publica-
tions is determined inside secure SGX enclaves provided
by the pub/sub service, which is typically deployed in a
public cloud. All subscriptions and publication messages
are encrypted using a symmetric cypher while outside the
SGX enclaves. The subscriptions and publication headers
are decrypted inside the enclave, where subscriptions are
stored. Then, the service routes the publication payloads
(encrypted with a different key) to matching subscribers.
For simplicity we leave out the details related to the key
provisioning, which can be consulted in [12].
We adapt the SCBR pub/sub implementation to a MapRe-
duce service by designing a pub/sub communication protocol
between the nodes involved in the distributed data process-
ing. Worker nodes will act as subscribers registering queries
to find out about new MapReduce job openings, and also
as publishers submitting their desired job details. The client
of the MapReduce service, which is also the data owner
will also act as both subscriber and publisher, registering
subscriptions for job details and publishing announcements
on new MapReduce jobs to be executed. The client will also
coordinate the routing from mapping to reducers using the
pub/sub system, and will finally publish the code and data to
the registered workers and obtain the results. We detail our
solution architecture, describing the exact steps executed in
the pub/sub based communication protocol in IV.
For testing our solution we consider a use case where the
target of the MapReduce service is to classify data using
the k-means clustering method. K-means is an unsupervised
learning algorithm widely used and adapted for data classifi-
cation purposes since its first mention in [13], which operates
as following: (i) a certain k number of clusters is fixed
a priori and k corresponding centers are defined for each
one of them; (ii) data items are iterated and assigned to the
nearest cluster center (typically through Euclidean distance);
and (iii) every cluster center is recomputed as the centroid of
the assigned data items (the mean of those points). Steps (ii)
and (iii) repeat until a termination criteria is reached (e.g. the
sum of distances between the old and the new cluster centers
is below a given threshold). For implementing k-means in
the MapReduce model we put (ii) in the map function and
(iii) in the reduce function as displayed in Figure 1.
For providing an easily programmable and efficiently
maintainable environment our framework offers the pos-
sibility to write the map and reduce code in simple Lua
scripts, which are run in the enclave using a Lua interpreter,
currently in version 5.3.2. Lua [14] is a lightweight multi-
paradigm programming language. The language API pro-
vides the possibility to call Lua functions from C/C++ code.
Using Lua is particularly interesting in an SGX secured
environment due to the reduced overhead, which fits with
the enclave restrictions. We discuss in further detail the eval-
uation of the k-means use case with our Lua implementation
in Section V.
Figure 1. Flow of K-means with MapReduce.
IV. SOLUTION ARCHITECTURE
In Figure 2 we display the entities composing our solution
architecture: clients, router (SCBR based pub/sub engine)
and workers, which can assume the role either of a mapper
or a reducer. Clients provide the code to be executed, the
data to be processed and gather the results after completion.
All communication channels use the 0MQ [15] message
passing library, having a central point in the SCBR pub/sub
engine, which we adapted from previous work [12] as briefly
described in Section III.
The SCBR engine is responsible for securely storing
subscriptions that contain the conditions under which each
message should be forwarded to the corresponding interested
party. Subscriptions, used in an initiation protocol for the
MapReduce processing as described further below, are stored
within the SGX protected memory area and every match
processing is done inside enclaves. Data is always encrypted
whenever outside of the enclaves. Although such a central-
ized approach is not suitable to large-scale data processing,
it is arguably useful for modest quantities of highly sensitive
data that could be, for instance, partitioned from higher
amounts of non-sensitive data. Nevertheless, it has been
demonstrated [16], [17] that it is possible to elastically scale
a pub/sub engine by specializing its functional steps into
replicable operators. That could dramatically improve the
network performance of such a centralized approach.
The MapReduce processing is started following an initial
message exchange displayed in Figure 3. Worker nodes reg-
ister their availability for MapReduce job openings through
JOB_OPENING subscriptions. The client registers his in-
terest in the details of the map and reduce tasks that the
workers are capable of doing through the JOB_DETAILS
subscription. When the client has a new job to execute it
advertises it through a JOB_OPENING publication, which
is received by workers that previously registered as available.
Client
Mapper SGX Reducer SGX
SCBR
Workers
SG
X
Figure 2. Entities.
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Figure 3. Session establishment protocol.
The workers submit then their desired details regarding the
job through a JOB_DETAILS publication by sending in the
message payload their further subscriptions for code and data
(particular to the role they choose: mapper or reducer). At
the end of this negotiation, if the client decides to hire a
worker, it registers on SCBR the received subscriptions for
code and data on the worker’s behalf. By doing so, the client
established the MapReduce chain and keeps track of how
many workers it has hired and of which kind (mappers or
reducers).
The provisioning of code and data is shown in Figure 4.
The client also includes the number of reducers along with
the Lua scripts in case of type MAP_CODETYPE, or the
number of mappers in case of type REDUCE_CODETYPE.
The purpose is to make the workers aware of how many
messages signaling the end of the stream they have to wait
before considering the work done. This is important because
the reduce phase can only start once all data for a given key
is routed to the intended worker. Additionally, the number of
reducers received by a mapper is used in a hash function that
takes as argument the mapped key and returns the indication
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Figure 4. Provisioning of code and data.
of which reducer it has to be forwarded to. After sending
the code, data is split by the client among the mappers, line
by line. The destination id is included in the header of the
MAP_DATATYPE publication.
Workers decrypt the received code and store inside the
enclaves waiting to start the execution. When data arrives,
mappers perform the processing and each one of the resul-
tant set of key-value pairs is forwarded to the proper reducer.
Its id is obtained after providing the key and number of
reducers as arguments to the hash function that comes along
with the code of the mapper. The shuffling phase is hence
conducted by the mappers. In order to forward data to the
following step, all the Lua script has to do is to call a special
function called push(key,value), and the framework handles
all the communication aspects of forwarding the data.
Regarding the execution environment, since SGX code
must be previously signed and no dynamic linking is
possible after the enclave creation, we ported a Lua [14]
virtual machine to run in protected area. Porting legacy
code to SGX means that every system call or input/output
instruction have to be dealt with, since these are not allowed
inside enclaves. Workers contain a Lua interpreter that runs
inside the enclaves, which loads the scripts that contain the
processing phases of map and reduce. This setting provides
a very accessible programming environment, which can be
easily used and efficiently maintained. We provide below a
basic example.
local json = require "json"
function hash(key,rcount)
return string.byte(key,1) % rcount
end
function combine(key,value)
local clist = json:decode(value)
local sum = 0
for k,v in pairs(clist) do
sum = sum + v
end
push(key,sum)
end
function map(key,value)
for word in value:gmatch("%w+") do
push(word,1)
end
end
Listing 1. Map code in Lua for word count
Listing 1 shows the sample code of a mapper of a word
count application. As it can be noticed, data is encoded in
JavaScript Object Notation (json). For convenience, the json
Lua parser is pre-loaded in the enclave of worker nodes, and
is accessible through the require command. The script can
contain as many helper functions as desired. The following
special functions, however, are called by the framework:
map(key, value) Contains the functional imple-
mentation of mapper.
combine(key, value) [Optional] Post-processing on
values grouped by keys.
hash(key,rcount) Returns the Reducer id that is
supposed to receive a given
key considering that there are
rcount Reducers in total.
Likewise, listing 2 shows a sample code for the reduce
step that contains a single special function:
reduce(key, value) Contains the functional imple-
mentation of reducer.
local json = require "json"
function reduce( key, value )
local clist = json:decode(value)
local sum = 0
for k,v in pairs(clist) do
sum = sum + v
end
push(key,sum)
end
Listing 2. Reduce code in Lua for word count
V. EVALUATION
We construct our evaluation using the k-means algorithm,
briefly described in Section III, a popular use-case for
cluster analysis in data mining and machine learning. In
our implementation, we partitioned n randomly generated bi-
dimensional coordinates into k clusters. In the map step, we
assign each observation to the nearest center by computing
and comparing their distances (n × k operations). Then,
we update the centers to become the centroid of assigned
coordinates (n operations) in the reduce step. This process
repeats until the average distance between the most recent
calculated centroids and the ones from the previous iteration
is less than a threshold.
We conducted all the experiments using two SGX capable
machines, both with processor Intel i7-6700 64bits, clock
of 3.4GHz, 8MB cache, 4 cores, 8 threads, with 8GB of
installed memory and SSD of 256GB. In terms of software,
we used the Intel SGX SDK 1.7.100 over Ubuntu 14.04.1,
kernel 4.2.0-42. Unless mentioned otherwise, messages were
all encrypted with AES-CTR [18] with key and input vector
both of 128 bits and were decrypted only inside the enclaves.
The process placement was made as follows: Machine 1:
The Client, entity responsible for providing code and data,
8 mappers and 5 reducers. Machine 2: 8 mappers and 5
reducers. The number of mappers was chosen to be twice
as much as the number of cores in each machine to take
advantage of parallelism, while the number of reducers was
set to be a divisor of input data size to stimulate an even
distribution of work among them. To illustrate how small
our final code-base is, Table I shows the memory section
sizes of executables and shared libraries that are loaded into
enclaves.
text data bss sum
client 379,968 26,672 376 407,016
worker 288,557 26,312 768 315,637
worker enclave 679,175 60,004 83,584 822,763
scbr 277,468 14,808 72 292,348
scbr enclave 278,967 7,456 80,608 367,031
Table I
BINARIES SIZE IN BYTES
Figure 5 illustrates 4 out of 76 iterations that K-means
took to converge when the threshold was set to zero. In this
example, we randomly generated 100,000 observations and
10 centers. As it can be seen in the first frame, the initial
centroids were all set on a small area in the bottom-left
corner by limiting the domain of generated coordinates. In
spite of this, they quickly assume positions that are closer
to the best fit. After just 6 iterations, the average distance of
centroids decreases more than six times. Besides, even with
an initial state closer to the final one, we can get a slower
convergence (90 iterations, as shown in Figure 6). The final
result depends on the initial points and there is no guarantee
that it is the global optimum, neither about how fast it will
converge.
For the following executions, we arbitrarily set the thresh-
old to be one thousandth of the diagonal of the rectangle that
contains all the observed points. That means that the iterative
process finishes when the average distance of centroids
between two subsequent iterations is less than that fraction,
so that we can avoid slow convergences. For the given
examples of Figure 6, this criteria would stop the executions
by the 41st (instead of 76th) and 21st (instead of 90th)
iterations. From the figure, we can see that there is no much
variation from those points on.
To assess the influence of input data size, namely the num-
ber of observations and centroids, on the memory usage and
Figure 5. K-means convergence. Iterations 0 (top left), 19 (top right), 38
(bottom left) and 76 (bottom right)
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Figure 6. K-means convergence.
time consumption, we conducted multiple experiments using
the two SGX capable machines described above. Figure 7
shows the average time it took to complete one iteration
of kmeans with varying input sizes. It can be noticed that,
although the variation on the number of clusters can cause
some inflection in the curves, the completion time is mostly
affected by the number of observed data points. Moreover,
while the two first increments on the number of data points
(n = 10k and n = 100k) caused a proportional increase on
consumed time with regards to the data growth (ten times),
the last one (n = 1M ) induced a twenty-fold rise. That
can be explained by the growth in the occurrence of cache
misses within each worker. When that happens, data must
be fetched from main memory. When using SGX protected
executions, this means one page has to be evicted from cache
(and hence, encrypted), while the one that is fetched must
be decrypted and checked for integrity and freshness (that
prevents tamper and replay attacks, respectively).
The described cache effect is well documented [12], [19],
[20] and can be noticed by the cache miss rates. Since
the reduce phase is more memory intensive, we chose to
make the average on the cache miss rates per second of
all 10 reducers in each execution, i.e., for the same second,
cache miss rates of reducers were summed and divided by
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Figure 7. Average time to run one iteration with varying input sizes
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10. Wall clocks were synchronized with a common NTP
server, so that the resulting skew was at the range of tens of
milliseconds and it should not affect the sampling resolution
of 1s. Figure 8 shows that measurement as reported by the
tool pidstat when the number of centroids is k = 50.
Note that y scale is logarithmic, so that the cache miss rates
for n = 1M is at least two orders of magnitude higher than
n = 100k.
Finally, we moved to appraising the influence of SGX
and encryption when compared to native executions (no
hardware protection). We ran the same datasets with a fixed
number of clusters k = 50 and observed points varying from
n = 1000 until n = 1M along with the four combinations
of turning on and off enclaves and encryption. Results
are plotted in Figure 9. We also included the overhead in
percentage. Encryption overhead was obtained by comparing
the average time it took to complete one iteration with and
without encryption both inside and outside the enclave, and
averaging the two values. SGX overhead was established
analogously. The time corresponds to the average of all
iterations in a single run of k-means (until the threshold was
reached). Coefficient of variation across multiple runs was
negligible. We can notice that encryption overhead is quite
low, of around 5%. Enclave execution, on the other hand,
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Figure 9. Encryption and SGX overhead
Split Shuffle Output
n = 1k 58.7 KB 112.1 KB 4.3 KB
n = 10k 257.2 KB 1.1 MB 4.5 KB
n = 100k 2.2 MB 11 MB 4.6 KB
n = 1M 19.1 MB 96.5 MB 4.6 KB
Table II
DATA VOLUME EXCHANGED PER ITERATION
is kept around 30% until we start to get high occurrence
of cache misses, as discussed before, when it reaches more
than 200%.
The data volume exchanged in each MapReduce step can
be seen in Table II. Numbers correspond to the average per
iteration for the same executions as Figure 9. We observe
an increase in overheads when cache misses rate grows.
Therefore, based on the processor’s cache size, we could
establish the maximum amount of data a single SGX-
capable machine would be able to handle before incurring
in too much overhead. In our experiments, we perceived that
behavior when processing amounts somewhere in between
11 MB and 96.5MB shared between 2 machines (average of
around 54MB, or 27MB per machine). Therefore, a rough
estimation would be to limit those amounts to three times the
cache size, or 24MB in our case. More scalability could be
provided horizontally, with the addition of more machines.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed in the current work a lightweight
framework for implementing secure MapReduce applica-
tions in an untrusted environment. Our approach does not
require any particular knowledge from the programmer of
cryptographic mechanisms for implementing the map and
reduce functions. Also, preserving privacy and integrity is
not dependent in any way on the specific characteristics of
the functions, simply taking advantage in this purpose of
the standard TEE characteristics of SGX enclaves. Besides
these advantages, our solution is easily maintainable relying
on a standard Lua interpreter for code execution.
The main objective of the current implementation was to
show its viability and to assess its behavior under different
conditions. We consider as a next step testing our prototype
at a larger scale and comparing it with other solutions for
securing MapReduce (e.g., [2], [4]). We are also considering
taking in account the shuffle phase security in respect to
attacks based on traffic analysis. We believe that detection
of tampering at network level and denial of service attacks
could be easily implemented through well known techniques
(e.g. sequential numbers, MACs, nonces), which we also
leave for future work.
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